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The strategic approach also seeks to combine axiomatic cooperative solutions and
non-cooperative solutions. Roger Myerson recently named this task the Nash pro-
gram.(Rubinstein (1985), p. 1151)
1 Introduction
A contest is a game in which players exert e¤ort in order to win a certain prize. Contests have
been used to analyze a variety of situations including lobbying, rent-seeking and rent-defending
contests, advertising, litigation, political campaigns, conict, patent races, arms races, sports
events or R&D competition. A crucial determinant for the equilibrium predictions of contests is
the specication of the so-called contest success function (CSF) which relates the playerse¤orts
and win probabilities. Justications for a particular CSF can be twofold. A justication can
be on normative grounds, because it is the unique CSF fullling certain axioms, or essential
properties. A justication can also be positive when it can be shown that the CSF arises from
the strategic interaction of players, thereby yielding a description of situations when it can be
expected to be realistic. The purpose of the present paper is to contribute to our understanding
of CSFs in both dimensions.
Formally, a contest success function associates, to each vector of e¤ortsG, a lottery specifying
for each agent a probability pi of getting the object. That is, pi = pi(G) is such that, for each
contestant i 2 N := f1; :::; ng, pi(G)  0, and
Pn
i=1 pi (G) = 1. For notational ease in the
present paper we consider vectors of e¤orts G with at least two strictly positive entries.
The canonical example of a contest situation is rent-seeking. In a pioneering paper, Tullock
(1980) proposed a special form of the contest success function, namely, given a positive scalar
R,
pi =
GRiPn
j=1G
R
j
; for i = 1; :::; n. (1)
Gradstein (1995, 1998) postulated the following variation of this form where, given qi > 0 for
all i 2 N ,
pi =
GiqiPn
j=1Gjqj
; for i = 1; :::; n. (2)
A generalization that comprises both previous functional forms is, given ai > 0 for all i 2 N ,
pi =
GRi qi + aiPn
j=1(G
R
j qj + aj)
; for i = 1; :::; n. (3)
A di¤erent functional form, the logit model, was proposed by Hirshleifer (1989) where, given a
positive scalar k,
pi =
ekGiPn
j=1 e
kGj
; for i = 1; :::; n. (4)
Note that the four expressions (1) (4) are specic instances of the following functional form
pi =
fi(Gi)Pn
j=1 fj(Gj)
; for i = 1; :::; n. (5)
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The so-called e¤ectivity functions fi are usually interpreted as determining how e¤ectiveagent
is e¤ort is in a¤ecting the win probability of agent i. Most papers dealing with contest models
in the literature analyze a CSF which is a special case of the form in (5) (Nitzan (1994), Konrad
(2004)). Consequently, the present paper will be mainly concerned with deriving foundations
for CSFs of this form.
However, there are also some CSFs in the literature which are not special cases of the form in
(5). The rst two consider the case of two contestants and build on the idea that only di¤erences
in e¤ort should matter  an idea introduced by Hirshleifer in (4). Baik (1998) proposed the
following form, given a positive scalar ,
p1 = p1(G1  G2) and p2 = 1  p1. (6)
Che and Gale (2000) postulate the following piece-wise linear di¤erence-form
p1 = max

min

1
2
+ (G1  G2); 1

; 0

and p2 = 1  p1. (7)
Recently, Alcalde and Dahm (2006) proposed a CSF that is neither a di¤erence-form contest
nor a special case of (5). Given a positive scalar R, the serial contest is dened as
pi =
nX
j=i
GRj  GRj+1
j GR1
, for i = 1; :::; n with Gn+1 = 0. (8)
As for justications of CSFs the most systematic approach has been normative and the
seminal paper is Skaperdas (1996). He proposed the following ve axioms:
(A1) Imperfect Discrimination: For all i 2 N , if Gi > 0, then pi > 0.
(A2) Monotonicity: For all i 2 N , pi is increasing in Gi and decreasing in Gj ; j 6= i.
(A3) Anonymity: For any permutation function  on the set of bidders we have
p(G) = p(G) for all G.
While these axioms are standard, the next two properties are more specic and relate win
probabilities in contests with di¤erent sets of active contestants.
(A4) Consistency: Let pMi (G) be contestant is probability of winning a contest played by a
subset M  N of contestants. For all i 2M , and for all M  N with at least two elements,
pMi (G) =
pi(G)P
j2M pj(G)
.
(A5) Independence: For all i 2M , pMi (G) is independent of Gj for all j =2M .
Together both axioms imply that the CSF satises Luces Choice Axiom (Clark and Riis
(1998)). This is an independence of irrelevant alternatives property: the probability that con-
testant i wins if player k does not participate is equal to the probability that i wins when
k participates given that k does not win. This axiom holds recursively for any subset of non-
participating bidders. A di¤erent interpretation is to require that if a subset M  N of con-
testants wishes to reallocate the total win probability assigned to them by the same contest
success function, each contestant should obtain the same win probability as before.
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Skaperdas showed that (A1)(A5) are equivalent to assume a CSF of the form given in (5)
with fi() = f() for all i 2 N , where f() is a positive increasing function of its argument.
Moreover, if the CSF is assumed to be homogeneous of degree zero1, i.e.
(A6) Homogeneity: For all G and each positive scalar 
pi(G) = pi(G) for all  > 0 and for all i 2 N
then, Properties (A1)(A6) are equivalent to assume a CSF of the form given in (1).2
An extension of Skaperdas results is given by Clark and Riis (1998) by dropping the anonymity
assumption. Skaperdas also axiomatized the logit model (4) by showing that it is equivalent to
properties (A1)(A5) above plus an additional property that asserts that the winning probability
of each player depends only on the di¤erence in the e¤orts made by all players.
In this paper we want to approach the issue of justifying CSFs mainly from a positive point
of view. We rst notice that the plausibility of the above properties depends on the context. In
particular it is easy to nd examples where Property (A4) does not hold, as we show next.
Example 1 Let n = 3. Players have to play against each other twice. If a player wins the
match, she gets 3 points. If she gets a draw she gets 1 point and if she loses she gets 0 points.
Suppose that the level of e¤ort is arbitrarily given. There are two equally likely states of the
world. In the rst state of the world, the scores obtained by the players are the following;
Player 1 against Player 2: 1 gets 4 points and 2 gets 1 point.
Player 1 against Player 3: 1 gets 0 points and 3 gets 6 points.
Player 2 against Player 3: 2 gets 6 points and 3 gets 0 points.
Thus, in this case, player 2 wins the contest because she gets 7 points (players 3 and 1 get 6
and 4 points respectively). In the second state of the world, results are identical to those above
except that
Player 1 against Player 3: 1 gets 6 points and 3 gets 0 points.
In this case, player 1 wins the contest because she gets 10 points (players 2 and 3 get 7 and 0
points respectively).
Thus, for a given level of e¤ort, the probability that player 1 wins the contest is 1/2. However,
if player 3 is removed from the contest and we assume that the score obtained in any particular
match is independent of the scores obtained in other matches, player 1 wins with probability 1.
Thus the ratio between probabilities of success of players 1 and 2 is altered when the third player
is not considered in the contest.
1Corchón (2000) has shown that homogeneity of degree zero implies that if pi() is continuous at 0 e¤ort for
all players, pi() must be constant on Gi=Gj any i; j, which is clearly absurd. Another possibility is that pi() is
undened at the point of 0 e¤ort by all players, as in the case considered by Tullock (see above).
2 In this case, as noticed by Esteban and Ray (1999), the rent-seeking model becomes a particular case of the
Cournot model.
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The example shows that complementing the normative approach through a positive perspec-
tive can be insightful. By taking into account specic institutional details of specic conict
situations, it allows to obtain a description of situations when a particular CSF can be expected
to be realistic.
In order to develop a positive perspective the present paper proposes two approaches to
CSFs. In the rst we investigate the implications of the in our view most natural approach
to probabilistic (or imperfectly discriminating) CSFs. We postulate the existence of a contest
administrator who allocates the prize to one of the contestants. However, contestants have
incomplete information about the type of the contest administrator. We show that this approach
can generate non-deterministic CSFs for any number of contestants. However, we are only able
to obtain prominent contest success functions for case of two contestants. When there are further
contestants, CSFs are likely to be less tractable.
Our second approach interprets contest success functions as sharing rules and establishes a
connection to bargaining and claims problems which is independent of the number of contestants.
The analysis exploits the observation that these problems are mathematically related but not
equivalent to the problem of assigning win probabilities in contests. A main result here is that
the generalization of the class of contest success functions axiomatized by Skaperdas given in (5)
can be understood as the weighted Nash bargaining solution where e¤orts represent the weights
of the agents. We turn then to the framework of bargaining with claims (Chun and Thomson
(1992)) to incorporate explicitly the contestantse¤orts in the description of the problem. This
allows to associate prominent solution concepts in this framework to the previously mentioned
class of contest success functions and to a generalized version of Che and Gales di¤erence form
contest.
Foundations for contest success functions have been reviewed by Konrad (2004) and we have
already described the most important results of the normative approach. Our paper contributes
to this literature indirectly by making connections to related problems which are well understood
from a normative point of view. For instance, we establish a relationship between Che and Gales
di¤erence-form CSF (7) and the principle of equal sacrice. However, the main aim of the present
paper is to provide a systematic positive approach to CSFs tailored to capture key elements of the
situation to be modelled. Given that this approach makes the resulting foundation necessarily
specic to the situation at hand, our paper complements existing positive justications tailored
for di¤erent situations. We are not aware of any work understanding CSFs as sharing rules as
our second approach does.3 However, our rst approach is related to other works. Fullerton and
McAfee (1999) and Baye and Hoppe (2003) o¤er micro-foundations for a subset of CSFs of the
form in (1) for the context of innovation tournaments and patent races. A major conceptional
3Anbarci, Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2002) present a model in which a two party conict over a resource can
either be settled through bargaining over the resource or through a contest. The contest denes the disagreement
point of the bargaining problem to which three di¤erent bargaining solutions are applied. In contrast, in our
framework we interpret bargaining to be over win probabilities and derive contest success functions as bargaining
rules.
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di¤erence between our approach and theirs is the nature of the underlying uncertainty. While in
our case the uncertainty has a centralized character (it comes from a single decision-maker), in
these models it is decentralized (it comes from the actions of the contestants). This is also true in
Hillman and Riley (1988) where a model of the political process is o¤ered in which the political
impact of e¤ort is uncertain. Similarly to our second approach Hillman and Riley succeed to
derive a CSF of the form in (1) only for the case of two contestants.4
2 External Decider
Assume that one person has to decide to award a prize to one of two contestants. In the situation
we have in mind contestants are uncertain about a characteristic of the decider that is relevant
for his decision. So rent-seekers exert e¤ort without knowing the realization of the characteristic
and then the decision-maker decides whom to give the prize based both on the contestants
e¤orts and his type.
Let  be the set of states of the world. Let  be an arbitrary element of . We assume
that  = [0; 1] and that  is uniformly distributed. Let Vi be the deciders payo¤ if the prize is
awarded to contestant i = 1; 2. Vi is assumed to depend on the state of the world, i.e. Vi = Vi().
This may reect the uncertainty in the contestantsminds about the preferences of the decider.
We will assume the following single-crossing property.
(SC) V1() is decreasing in  and V2() is strictly increasing in .
Taking into account e¤orts, let Ui(Vi(); Gi) be the deciders payo¤ if the prize is awarded
to contestant i = 1; 2. This function is assumed to be increasing in both arguments. For the
sake of interpretation let Gi be interpreted as the level of advertisement (resp. quality) made
(resp. provided) by contestant i = 1; 2. Let
0 =
8><>:
1 if U1(;G1) > U2(;G2);8 2 
0 if U1(;G1) < U2(;G2);8 2 
fjU1(;G1) = U2(;G2)g otherwise.
(9)
Under our assumptions 0 is well-dened and unique. Moreover, 0 equals p1, the probability
that contestant 1 gets the prize. Thus, we can solve p1 as a function of G1 and G2 and obtain
p1 = p1(G1; G2):
Summing up, the contest success function can be derived as arising from the maximization
of the payo¤ function of the decider. We now provide several examples:
4There is also a relationship to probabilistic voting models (Coughlin (1992)) and to Dahm and Porteiro
(2006). The latter paper derives specic instances of CSFs of the form in (5) for the case of two interest groups
lobbying a political decision-maker whose decision depends both on the lobbiese¤orts and on the information
the decision-maker has.
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Example 2 Let U1(;G1) = V1()+a1G1 and U2(;G2) = V2()+a2G2, where a1; a2 > 0. Thus,
a1G1 a2G2 = V2() V1()  z(), say. Since z() is invertible we get, p1 = z 1(a1G1 a2G2)
which is the form in (6) considered by Baik (1998).5 Notice that this procedure is identical to
the one used in models of spatial di¤erentiation in order to obtain the demand function (see
Hotelling (1929)).
Example 3 Let U1(;G1) =  + 2G1   1=2 and U2(;G2) =   + 2G2 + 1=2, where  is a
positive scalar. In this case, it is easily calculated that p1 = max fmin f1=2 + (G1  G2); 1g ; 0g.
We obtain (7) the family of di¤erence-form contest success functions analyzed by Che and Gale
(2000).
Example 4 Let U1(;G1) = (1   )f1(G1) and U2(;G2) = f2(G2). Here we obtain p1 =
f1(G1)=(f1(G1) + f2(G2)). This is an instance of (5) a generalization of the family of contest
success functions axiomatized by Skaperdas (1996).
Example 5 Let U1(;G1) = f1(G1) and U2(;G2) = 2f2(G2) if   1=2 and U2(;G2) =
f2(G2)=(2(1  )) if 1=2   < 1. Analogous reasoning as before yields p1 = f1(G1)=(2f2(G2)) if
f1(G1)  f2(G2) and p1 = 1  f2(G2)=(2f1(G1)) otherwise. This expression is a generalization
of the family of serial contests in (8) analyzed in Alcalde and Dahm (2006).
The question is if any contest success function can be derived from payo¤ maximization of
the decider in the way we did in the examples above. Let us consider the following denition,
in which we deal with the general case of two or more rent-seekers:
Denition 2.1 The contest success function pi = pi(G1; G2; :::; Gn) is rationalizable if there is
a list of payo¤ functions Ui = Ui(;Gi) with Ui() strictly increasing on Gi; i = 1; 2; :::; n such
that
pi(G1; G2; :::; Gn) = probabilityfUi(;Gi) > Uj(;Gj);8j 6= ig:
Proposition 2.1 Let p1(G1; G2) be strictly increasing on G1 and strictly decreasing on G2.
Then p1(; ) is rationalizable by a payo¤ function fullling the single crossing condition (SC).6
Proof. Let G2 be given, say G2 = G02 . Thus, p1 = p1(G1; G02). Since this function is strictly
increasing on G1 it is invertible. This inverse depends on G02, so let us write it as G1 = P (p1; G02).
Repeating this argument for all possible values of G02, we obtain G1 = H(p1; G2), say. Now let
5Alternatively, we may assume that the payo¤ function of the decider is Ui = Vi()   ajGj , i 6= j, reecting
the disutility received from the e¤ort (bribe) made by contestant 2, if the prize is awarded to rent-seeker 1. The
same applies to Example 3 and to Example 4 by taking U1 = (1  )=f2(G2) and U1 = =f1(G1).
6To be fully precise the statement of this proposition refers to contest success functions that are exhaustive
in the sense that there is competition for the whole probability mass. Formally, for a given G02, as G1 goes to
innity, p1 goes to 1 (and similarly, for a given G01, as G2 goes to innity, p1 goes to 0). Notice that in Examples
2 5 this property is fullled. If the contest success function species that there is a rent-seeker who obtains a
certain probability of winning the prize no matter what e¤ort levels are, then the argument of the proof can be
adapted to rationalize the part of the probability mass which is subject to competition.
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U1 = G1 and U2 = H(;G2). By the properties of p1(; ), H(; ) is strictly increasing on  and
G2. Also U1 is strictly increasing on G1 and constant on , so the SC assumption holds. By
construction, 0 (as dened in equation (9)) equals p1 so the result is proved.
In the case of three rent-seekers the previous argument does not yield microfoundations for
the class of contest success functions axiomatized by Skaperdas. There are two reasons for that
which are explained in Examples 6 and 7 below. In both examples we assume that there are
three rent-seekers and that the single crossing property (SC) above holds for contestants 1 and 3.
The rst example shows that it might be impossible to partition  in three non-empty intervals
in which case Skaperdasaxiom (A1) will be violated. Moreover, the win probability of a given
contestant might not be responsive to changes in the e¤orts of all other rent-seekers, as in (5).
Example 6 Let us assume that Ui(1=2; Gi) ! 1 when Gi ! 1; i = 1; 3. This assumption is
fullled in the payo¤ functions used in Examples 2 and 3 above. In the case of Example 4 and
5 this assumption is fullled if fi(Gi) ! 1 when Gi ! 1. U2 is assumed to be continuous in
 and G2. Let U 02(G2) = maxU2(;G2),  2 . The maximum exists and varies continuously
with G2 (by Berges maximum theorem). By taking G1 and G3 large enough, say G01 and G03,
the property (SC) and the assumption made at the beginning of the example imply,
U1(;G
0
1) > U
0
2(G2);8 2 [0; 1=2)
U3(;G
0
3) > U
0
2(G2);8 2 (1=2; 1]:
Thus, rent-seeker 2 never obtains the prize. Moreover, because U 02() is continuous in G2, small
variations in G2 do not a¤ect neither p1 nor p3. Thus, the class of functions axiomatized by
Skaperdas can not be obtained from payo¤ maximization.
The next example shows that, even if  can be partitioned in three non-empty intervals, the
form axiomatized by Skaperdas can not be obtained from payo¤ maximization.
Example 7 Suppose that  = [0; 00] [ [00; 000] [ [000; 1] and that
U1(;G1) > Uj(;Gj); j = 2; 3;8 2 [0; 00)
U2(;G2) > Uj(;Gj); j = 1; 3;8 2 (00; 000)
U3(;G3) > Uj(;Gj); j = 1; 2;8 2 (000; 1]:
If Uj(; ) are continuous in , the previous equations imply that U1(00; G1) = U2(00; G2), and
U2(
000; G2) = U3(000; G3). Thus, p1 = 00, p2 = 000   00 and p3 = 1   000. It is clear that p1
(resp. p3) does not depend on G3 (resp. G1) for small variations of this variable. Thus, the
required functional form can not be obtained in this case.
Albeit this di¢ culty in deriving the class of functions axiomatized by Skaperdas for more
than three contestants, contestants uncertainty about the type of the contest administrator
seems to be a reasonable approach to CSFs. Therefore, it is an important research program to
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nd contest success functions that are rationalizable according to Denition 2.1 above and to
work out the consequences of these new functional forms on equilibrium, comparative statics, etc.
We show now that although this route appears to be promising, it is not free from di¢ culties.
We will work out two examples and we will show that in both cases:
 Contest success functions are neither di¤erentiable nor concave.
 Despite the symmetric nature of basic data, no symmetric Nash equilibrium exists.
However, we also point out that these are problems that have been successfully dealt with
in the analysis of the serial contest (Alcalde and Dahm (2006)).
Example 8 Let U1(;G1) = (1   )G1, U2(;G2) = G22=3 and U3(;G3) = G3. Notice that
if G1 = G2 = G3, p1 = p2 = p3 = 1=3. We will compute the best reply of contestant 1.
If G22=3 < G3 we have two cases: First, if G1 < G22=3, then p1 = 0. Second, if G1  G22=3,
then
p1 =
(
(G1  G22=3) =G1 if G1 < (G3G22=3) = (G3  G22=3)
G1=(G1 +G3) otherwise.
If G22=3  G3 we have again two cases
p1 =
(
0 if G1 < G22=3
(G1  G22=3) =G1 otherwise.
In a symmetric equilibrium G^ we have G1  G22=3 and G1 < (G3G22=3) = (G1  G22=3).
Thus, rent-seeker 1 maximizes V (G1   G22=3)=G1   G1, where V is the value of the prize. If
the equilibrium is symmetric it must be at positive level of e¤ort. Thus, the maximum is interior
and the rst order condition yields the best reply, namely G1 = (V G22=3)1=2.
For G^1 = G^2 this yields G^1 = V 2=3. We now have to make sure that this payo¤ is larger than
the payo¤ associated to G1 = 0 (yielding a p1 and a payo¤ equal to 0). This is equivalent to
G^2  V 27=100, which contradicts G^1 = G^2 = V 2=3.
Example 8 can be criticized because the existence of endpoints (0 and 1) which we know are
troublesome when dealing with this kind of models (see dAspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse
(1979)). Thus, we now adapt the model of Salop (1979) to our framework.
Example 9 Suppose that rent-seekers are symmetrically distributed in the unit circle, which is
now our set of states of the world. Assume that 1 competes only with 2 (resp. 3) for  2 [0; 1=3]
(resp.  2 [2=3; 1]). If the prize is awarded to 1 (resp. 2), the deciders payo¤s for  2 [0; 1=3]
are U1(;G1) = u   k + G1 (resp. U2(;G2) = u   k(1=3   ) + G2 ), where u, k and  are
positive scalars and  < 1. Thus, the state of the world for which, given e¤orts, the decider is
indi¤erent between both candidates is
0 = minfmaxf1=6 + (G1  G2 ) =(2k); 0g; 1=3g:
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A similar reasoning in the case of 1 and 3 yields
00 = minfmaxf5=6 + (G3  G1 ) =(2k); 2=3g1g:
Dene
000 = minfmaxf1=3 + (2G1  G2  G3 ) =(2k); 0g2=3g:
Thus, the probability that 1 gets the prize is as follows
p1 =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if 0 = 0 and 00 = 1
0 if 0 < 0  1=3 and 00 = 1
1  00 if 0 = 0 and 2=3  00 < 1
000 = 0 + 1  00 if 0 < 0  1=3 and 2=3  00 < 1.
A symmetric equilibrium G^ requires that G^1 maximizes 1s payo¤s, given G^2 and G^3 and that
G^1 = G^2 = G^3. Thus, G^1 maximizes 000V   G1, where V is the value of the prize. If the
maximum is interior, G^1 = (V=k)
1=(1 ). Thus if payo¤s for 1 for this value of e¤orts are
negative, 0 e¤ort is the best reply and no symmetric equilibrium exists.
Note that it is straightforward to extend the last example to more than three contestants.
The so derived CSF can be seen as an extension of Che and Gales linear di¤erence form (given
in (7)) to more than two contestants. Note that competition among contestants in this model
is in the spirit of the chain marketmodel of monopolistic competition (see Chamberlin (1956)
and Friedman (1979)).
3 Contest Success Functions as Sharing Rules
Notice that, although the approach pursued in the previous section explicitly models a politician
or contest administrator, the role of the latter is just to choose mechanically the policy alternative
that maximizes his utility given his type and the e¤ort levels exerted. Is it possible go even
further and provide a rationale for contest success functions without even modelling the contest
administrator? In order to provide such a rationale we establish now a connection to bargaining
and claims problems that only involves contestants. In order to highlight this relationship the
exposition and the proof of Proposition 3.1 follow as closely as possible Dagan and Volij (1993).
3.1 ClassicalBargaining
A contest problem is a vector f(G) = (f1(G1); :::; fn(Gn)) with at least two entries each of
which strictly positive.7 Since we consider a xed vector of e¤orts G, we will simply use the
notation fi instead of fi(Gi) and f instead of f(G). An allocation in a contest problem is a
n-tuple p = (p1; :::; pn) 2 Rn with 0  pi  1 and
Pn
i=1 pi = 1. A contest success function is a
function that assigns a unique allocation to each contest problem.
7 If fi(Gi) = 0 for some contestant i, assign zero win probability to this agent and consider the reduced vector
in which the entry corresponding to agent i is missing.
9
We dene now a bargaining problem associated with each contest problem. A bargaining
problem is a pair (S;d) where S  Rn is a compact convex set, d 2 S and there exists s 2 S such
that si > di; i = 1; :::; n. The set S, the feasible set, consists of all utility vectors attainable by
the n contestants through unanimous agreement. The disagreement point d is the utility vector
obtained if there is no agreement. In our context it seems natural to dene
S =
(
p 2 Rn
0  pi  1 and
nX
i=1
pi  1
)
and d = 0.
This can be interpreted as contestants bargaining over all possible assignments of win probabil-
ities. If no agreement is reached, all win probabilities are zero.
A bargaining solution is a function  assigning to each bargaining problem (S;d) a unique
element in S. We are interested in the weighted Nash solution with weights .
Denition 3.1 Let i > 0 for all i = 1; :::; n. The -asymmetric Nash solution is dened as
  = argmax
p2S
ni=1 (pi   di)i :
Next result is an adaptation of a result obtained by Dagan and Volij (1993) in a di¤erent
framework.
Proposition 3.1 The -asymmetric Nash solution for  = f induces a generalization of the
class of contest success functions axiomatized by Skaperdas (given by equation (5)).
Proof. Let f be a contest problem, consider the associated bargaining problem and let
  = p. The rst-order conditions of the maximization problem dening the asymmetric Nash
solution imply that
pj =
j
i
pi ; for all i; j 2 N .
Given the Pareto optimality of the asymmetric Nash solution we have that
Pn
j=1 pj = 1. This
implies pi = i=
Pn
j=1 j .
Since the preceding result sheets light on the class of contest success functions axiomatized
by Skaperdas from a very di¤erent angel than the approach of the previous section, it is of
interest in its own right. However, it also opens the door to understand CSFs as the outcome
of strategic bargaining models based on Rubinsteins alternating o¤ers game. Since it is well
known that under certain conditions the asymmetric Nash solution can be supported by such a
game, it follows that alternative conditions thought to reect reasonable properties of underlying
institutional details can yield alternative CSFs.
3.2 Bargaining with Claims
It might seem odd that, while the e¤ort vector f denes a contest problem, this information
is not used in the description of the associated bargaining problem (S;d). If we want to incor-
porate this information in the description of the problem, the relevant framework is the one of
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bargaining problems with claims (Chun and Thomson (1992)).8 A contest bargaining problem
is then a triple (S;d;f) with the following interpretation: Contestants bargain over all possible
assignments of win probabilities. The contestantse¤ectivity functions translate individual e¤ort
into an aspiration pointf . Thus, f(G) measures the social merit that society or the decider
awards to the vector of e¤orts G.
If no unanimous agreement is reached, all win probabilities are zero. A contest bargaining
solution  assigns to each such triple a unique element in S. A maximal point p of S is a point
such that
Pn
j=1 pj = 1. The proportional solution is dened as follows.
Denition 3.2 The proportional solution P is dened as the maximal point p of S on the
segment connecting the disagreement point d and the aspiration point f .
Proposition 3.2 The proportional solution induces a generalization of the class of contest suc-
cess functions axiomatized by Skaperdas (given by equation (5)).
Proof. Let f be a contest problem, consider the associated bargaining problem with claims
and let P = p. The line which passes through the two points d and f is the set of vectors x
of the form x = (1   t)d + t f = tf , with t 2 R. Given that p is a maximal point, we have
that t = 1=
Pn
j=1 fj . This implies p

i = fi=
Pn
j=1 fj .
The richer description of bargaining problems with claims has allowed to dene an alternative
solution that also explicitly builds on the aspiration point f . Bossert (1993) analyzes the claim-
egalitarian solution. For the purpose of the next proposition it su¢ ces to consider the case of
two contestants. The following denition is adapted to our context because in contest problems
there is no upper bound on individual e¤ort levels, that is, f .
Denition 3.3 Let n = 2 and w.l.o.g. x fh  fl. The claim-egalitarian solution E is dened
as the maximal point p of S such that fh   ph = fl   pl if fh   fl  1. Otherwise ph = 1 and
pl = 0.
The claim-egalitarian solution selects a point on the Pareto frontier of S such that the loss
of each contestant compared with his aspiration level is the same for all agents (if such a point
exists). This is an egalitarian solution in the sense that the absolute amount each agent has to
give up is equalized across contestants. The next proposition says that this idea is the same as
saying that only di¤erences in e¤ort matter.
Proposition 3.3 For n = 2, the claim-egalitarian solution induces a generalization of Che and
Gales di¤erence form contest success function, that is,
Ei = p
CG0
i (G) := max

min

1
2
+
1
2
(fi   fj) ; 1

; 0

for i = 1; 2.
8Notice that a contest problem is not equivalent to a bargaining problem with claims. One important di¤erence
is that in contest problems there is no upper bound on individual e¤ort levels, that is, f .
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Proof. The fact that if jfi   fj j  1 then Ei = pCG
0
i (G) is obvious. Suppose jfi   fj j  1.
Since pj = 1  pi, we have fi   pi = fj   (1  pi). Rearranging yields the desired expression.
Notice that when fi(Gi) = 2Gi for i = 1; 2 where  is a positive scalar, we obtain (7), the
class of linear di¤erence-form functions analyzed in Che and Gale (2000). While this contest is
only dened for the case of two contestants, analyzing the strategic implications of di¤erence-
form contests with more contestants is an interesting task for future research. However, it is
not clear how the contest success function should be extended. Notice that the Salop model
of Example 9 and the bargaining solution by Bossert give di¤erent recommendations for this
extension. The appropriate extension depends therefore on the application and institutional
details the contest model is intended to capture.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper has investigated foundations for prominent contest success functions based on two
di¤erent approaches. The rst analyzes the implications of contestantsincomplete information
concerning the typeof the contest administrator. The second understands CSFs as sharing
rules and makes a connection to bargaining and claims problems. Both approaches provide
foundations for popular contest success functions and guidelines for the denition of new ones.
The results of this paper suggest two lines for future research on contest success functions.
On the normative side, the implications of linking the problem of assigning win probabilities
in contests to bargaining, claims and taxation problems are twofold. On one hand, this connec-
tion might yield an improved understanding of existing contest success functions, while, on the
other hand, it suggests guidelines for the denition of new ones. As for the former, for instance,
proportionality principles have been defended at least since the philosophers of ancient Greece.
Therefore, it seems possible to obtain di¤erent characterizations of the class of contest success
functions axiomatized by Skaperdas using ideas of characterizations of proportionality stressed
in these related problems.9 As for the latter, di¤erent normative principles might lead to the
formulation of di¤erent classes of contest success functions. A case in point here is the claim-
egalitarian solution that gives a recommendation how to extend the di¤erence-form functions
analyzed in Che and Gale to more than two contestants.
On the positive side, the implications for future research parallel the normative ones. On
one hand, strategic foundations of solution concepts in bargaining, claims and taxation problems
that can be related to popular contest success functions might yield rationales for the latter.
An example is to link contests with the Bilateral Principle that has proved a fruitful way to
incorporate Luces Choice Axiom into game theory. Dagan et al. (1997) have provided a game
form capturing the non-cooperative dimension of the consistency property of bankruptcy rules.10
9Note that the class of problems in which win probabilities are assigned has a particularly simple structure.
This implies that a characterization of a solution for a larger class of problems does not need to characterize a
solution for contests.
10Notice that a contest problem is not equivalent to a bankruptcy problem in which the estate is equal to one,
since in contest problems there is no lower bound on the sum of individual e¤ort levels, that is,
Pn
j=1 fj .
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An adaptation of their result in our framework shows that a generalization of the class of contest
success functions axiomatized by Skaperdas (given by equation (5)), can be supported by a pure
strategy subgame perfect equilibrium of a certain non-cooperative game.
On the other hand, both approaches pursued in the present paper highlight that strategic
foundations for contest success functions are sensitive to details. By incorporating realistic
details of contest situations novel contest success functions can be derived. Examples are the
recommendation of the Salop model how to extend Che and Gales di¤erence-form function to
more than two contestants or the e¤ects of modifying Rubinsteins alternating o¤ers bargaining
game.
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